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Abstract. The paper considers the consensus problem in a partially
synchronous system with Byzantine faults. It turns out that, in the
partially synchronous system, all deterministic algorithms that solve
consensus with Byzantine faults are leader-based. This is not the case
of benign faults, which raises the following fundamental question: is it
possible to design a deterministic Byzantine consensus algorithm for a
partially synchronous system that is not leader-based? The paper gives
a positive answer to this question, and presents a leader-free algorithm
that is resilient-optimal and signature-free.
1 Introduction
In a distributed system of n processes, where each process has an initial value,
Byzantine consensus is the problem of agreeing on a common value, even though
some of the processes may fail in arbitrary, even malicious, ways. Consensus is
related to the implementation of state machine replication, atomic broadcast,
etc. It was ﬁrst identiﬁed by Pease, Shostak and Lamport [1], formalized as
the interactive consistency problem and solved in a synchronous system. An
algorithm achieves interactive consistency if it allows the nonfaulty processes
to come to a consistent view of the initial values of all the processes, including
the faulty ones. Once interactive consistency has been achieved, the nonfaulty
processes can reach consensus by applying a deterministic averaging or ﬁltering
function on the values of their view. It is shown in [1] that in a synchronous
system 3t + 1 processes are needed to solve the Byzantine consensus problem
without signatures, where t is the maximum number of Byzantine processes.
Later, Fischer, Lynch and Peterson [2] proved that in an asynchronous sys-
tem, no deterministic asynchronous consensus protocol can tolerate even a single
crash failure. The problem can however be solved using randomization even with
Byzantine faults, with at least 5t+ 1 processes, as shown by BenOr [3] and Ra-
bin [4]. Later, Bracha [5] increased the resiliency of the randomized algorithm
to 3t + 1 using a “reliable broadcast” primitive.
In 1988, Dwork, Lynch and Stockmeyer [6], considered an asynchronous sys-
tem that eventually becomes synchronous (called partially synchronous system).
The consensus algorithms proposed in [6], for benign and for Byzantine faults,
achieve safety in all executions, while guaranteeing liveness only if there exists
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a period of synchrony. Recently, several papers have considered the partially
synchronous system model for Byzantine consensus [7,8,9,10].
However, [10] points out a potential weakness of these Byzantine consensus
algorithms, namely that they can suﬀer from “performance failure”. According
to [10], a performance failure occurs when messages are sent slowly by a Byzan-
tine leader, but without triggering protocol timeouts, and the paper points out
that the PBFT leader-based algorithm [7] is vulnerable to such an attack. Simi-
lar arguments are mentioned in [11] and in [12], where Lamport suggests the use
of a virtual leader.
Interestingly, all deterministic Byzantine algorithms for non-synchronous sys-
tems are leader-based, e.g., [6,7,8,9]. Even the protocol in [10] is leader-based.
However, the authors of [10] managed to make the leader-based protocol less
vulnerable to performance failure attacks than PBFT [7] through a complicated
mechanism that enables non-leader processes to (i) aggressively monitor the
leader’s performance, and (ii) compute a threshold level of acceptable perfor-
mance. Note that randomized consensus algorithms such as [3,4] are not leader-
based. This raises the following fundamental question: is it possible to design
a deterministic Byzantine consensus algorithm for a partially synchronous sys-
tem that is not leader-based? With such an algorithm, performance failure of
Byzantine processes might be harmless.
One may imagine that leader-free (non-leader-based) algorithms for benign
faults might be extended for Byzantine faults. A leader-free algorithm typically
consists of a sequence of rounds, where in each round all processes send messages
to all, and a correct process updates its value based on the values received. It
is not diﬃcult to design an algorithm based on this all-to-all communication
pattern that does not violate the validity and agreement properties of consensus,
even with Byzantine faults. However, termination requires that in some round r
all correct processes receive exactly the same set of messages (from correct and
from faulty processes). Let us denote this property for round r by uniform(r).
Indeed, if uniform(r) holds and each correct process applies a deterministic
function to the received values, the conﬁguration becomes univalent. Can we
ensure the existence of a round r in which uniform(r) holds?
For benign faults, it is easy to guarantee that during the synchronous period of
the partially synchronous system, in every round r, all correct processes receive
messages from the same set of processes. This is not the case for Byzantine faults.
In round r, a Byzantine process could send a message to some correct process,
and no message to some other correct process. If this happens, uniform(r) does
not hold. Therefore one may think that with Byzantine faults the leader is needed
to ensure termination, and conclude that no deterministic leader-free Byzantine
consensus algorithm could exist in a partially synchronous system. In this paper,
we show that this intuition is wrong.
Our new idea is the following. We started from the observation that leader-
free consensus algorithms exist for the synchronous system, both for benign
faults (e.g., the FloodSet algorithm [13]) and for Byzantine faults (e.g., the al-
gorithm based on interactive consistency [1]). However, these algorithms violate
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agreement if executed during the asynchronous period of a partially synchronous
system. Therefore we tried to combine these algorithms with a second algorithm
that never violates agreement in an asynchronous system. This methodology
turned out to be successful, and the resulting leader-free Byzantine consensus
algorithm, is presented here. The algorithm requires 3t + 1 processes and does
not rely on digital signatures.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We deﬁne the consensus problem
and our system model in Section 2. Our methodology to derive a leader-free
consensus algorithm for Byzantine faults is presented in Section 3.1 Future work
is discussed in Section 4. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 5.
2 Deﬁnitions and System Model
2.1 Byzantine Consensus
We consider a set Π of n processes, among which at most t can be Byzantine
faulty. Nonfaulty processes are called correct processes. Each process has an
initial value. We formally deﬁne consensus by the following properties:
– Strong validity: If all correct processes have the same initial value, this is the
only possible decision value.
– Agreement: No two correct processes decide diﬀerently.
– Termination: All correct processes eventually decide.
2.2 System Model
We consider a partially synchronous system as deﬁned in [6] in which processes
communicate through message passing. As in [6], we consider an abstraction on
top of the system model, namely a round model, deﬁned next. Using this abstrac-
tion, rather than the raw system model, improves the clarity of the algorithms
and simpliﬁes the proofs.
There are two fault models considered with Byzantine processes: “authen-
ticated Byzantine” faults, and “Byzantine” faults [6]. In both models a faulty
process behaves arbitrarily, but in the authenticated Byzantine model messages
can be signed by the sender, and it is assumed that the signature cannot be
forged by any other process. No signatures are used with Byzantine faults, but
the receiver of a message knows the identity of the sender.
2.3 Basic Round Model
In the round model, processing is divided into rounds of message exchange. Each
round r consists of a sending step denoted by Srp (sending step of p for round
r), and of a state transition step denoted by T rp . In a sending step, each process
sends a message to all. A subset of the messages sent is received at the beginning
of the state transition step: messages can get lost, and a message sent in round
1 A simpler algorithm that uses digital signatures is proposed in [14].
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r can only be received in round r. We denote by σrp the message sent by p in
round r, and by μrp the messages received by process p in round r (μ
r
p is a vector
of size n, where μrp[q] is the message received from q). Based on μrp, process p
updates its state in the state transition step.
Let GSR (Global Stabilization Round) be the smallest round, such that for all
rounds r ≥ GSR, the message sent in round r by a correct process q to a correct
process p is received by p in round r. This is formally expressed by the following
predicate (where C denotes the set of correct processes):
∀r ≥ GSR : Pgood(r), where Pgood(r) ≡ ∀p, q ∈ C : μrp[q] = σrq .
An algorithm that ensures — in a partially synchronous system — the ex-
istence of GSR such that ∀r ≥ GSR : Pgood(r), is given in [6]. Note that
“∀r ≥ GSR : Pgood(r)” is suﬃcient for the termination of our algorithms, but
not necessary. If the system is synchronous, the following stronger property can
be ensured: ∀r : Pgood(r).
3 From Synchrony to Partial Synchrony
In this section we explain our methodology to design a leader-free consensus
algorithm that tolerates Byzantine faults without signatures. We start with a
leader-free consensus algorithm for Byzantine faults in a synchronous system
model, and then extend it to a leader-free consensus algorithm in a partially
synchronous system.
3.1 Leader-Free Consensus Algorithm for a Synchronous System
One of the ﬁrst consensus algorithms that tolerates Byzantine faults in syn-
chronous systems was proposed by Pease, Shostak and Lamport [1]. It is based
on an algorithm that solves the interactive consistency problem, which consists
for each correct process p to compute a vector of values, with an element for
each of the n processes, such that
– The correct processes compute exactly the same vector;
– The element of the vector corresponding to a given correct process is the
initial value of that process.
The algorithm presented in [1] is not leader-based, does not require signatures,
tolerates t < n/3 Byzantine faults, and consists of t + 1 rounds of exchange of
messages. We brieﬂy recall the principle of this algorithm (see Algorithm 1).
The information maintained by each process during the algorithm can be
represented as a tree (called Exponential Information Gathering (EIG) tree
in [13,15]), in which each path from the root to a leaf contains t+2 nodes. Thus
the height of the tree is t+1. The nodes are labeled with sequences of processes’
identities in the following manner. The root is labeled with the empty sequence
λ (|λ| = 0). Let i be an internal node in the tree with label α = p1p2 . . . pr; for
every q ∈ Π such that q /∈ α, node i has one child labeled αq. Node i with label
α will be simply called “node α”.
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Algorithm 1. EIGByz with n > 3t (code of process p)
1: Initialization:
2: Wp := {〈λ, vp〉} /* vp is the initial value of process p; valp(λ) = vp */
3: Round r : /* 1 ≤ r ≤ t + 1 */
4: Srp:
5: send {〈α, v〉 ∈ Wp : |α| = r − 1 ∧ p /∈ α ∧ v = ⊥} to all processes
6: T rp :
7: for all {q | 〈α, v〉 ∈ Wp ∧ |α| = r − 1 ∧ q ∈ Π ∧ q /∈ α} do
8: if 〈β, v〉 is received from process q then
9: Wp := Wp ∪ {〈βq, v〉} /* valp(βq) = v */
10: else
11: Wp := Wp ∪ {〈βq,⊥〉} /* valp(βq) = ⊥ */
12: if r = t + 1 then
13: for all 〈α, v〉 ∈ Wp from |α| = t to |α| = 1 do
14: Wp := Wp \ 〈α, v〉 /* replace valp(α) . . . */
15: if ∃v′ s.t. |〈αq, v′〉 ∈ Wp| ≥ n − |α| − t then
16: Wp := Wp ∪ 〈α, v′〉 /* . . . with newvalp(α) */
17: else
18: Wp := Wp ∪ 〈α,⊥〉 /* . . . with newvalp(α) */
19: for all q ∈ Π do /* level 1 of the tree */
20: Mp[q] := v s.t. 〈q, v〉 ∈ Wp
Intuitively, valp(p1p2 . . . pr) (which denotes the value of node p1p2 . . . pr in p’s
tree) represents the value v that pr told p at round r that pr−1 told pr at round
r− 1 that . . . that p1 told p2 at round 1 that p1’s initial value is v. Each correct
process p maintains the tree using a set Wp of pairs 〈node label , node value〉. At
the beginning of round r, each process p sends the (r−1)th level of its tree to all
processes (line 5). When p receives a message from q in format 〈p1p2...pr, v〉, it
adds 〈p1p2...prq, v〉 to its set Wp (line 9). If p fails to receive a message it expects
from process q, p simply adds 〈p1p2 . . . prq,⊥〉 to its set Wp (line 11).
Information gathering as described above continues for t+1 rounds, until the
entire tree has been ﬁlled in. At this point the second stage of local computation
starts. Every process p applies to each subtree a recursive data reduction function
to compute a new value (lines 13 to 18). The value of the reduction function on
p’s subtree rooted at a node labeled α is denoted newvalp(α). The reduction
function is deﬁned for a node α as follows.
– If α is a leaf, its value does not change (newval(α) = val(α));
– Otherwise, if there exists v such that n− |α| − t children have value v, then
newval(α) = v, else newval(α) = ⊥ (lines 16 and 18).
The reason for a quorum of size n − |α| − t can be explained as follows.2 Each
correct process, at the end of round t + 1, has constructed a tree with t + 2
levels. Any node in level 0 < k < t+1 has n−k children and a label α such that
|α| = k. If α is a label with only correct processes, then all its children except t
(i.e., n− k − t children) have the same value.
At the end of round t + 1, every correct process p constructs a vector Mp of
size n (corresponding to the level 1 of its tree), where Mp[q] is the new value of
process q (line 20). EIGByz ensures that:
2 Since n > 3t, this quorum can be replaced by n+t
2
− |α| (see [1]).
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– The correct processes compute exactly the same vector, i.e., ∀p, q ∈ C :
Mp = M q, and
– The element of the vector corresponding to a given correct process q is the
initial value of that process, i.e., ∀p, q ∈ C : Mp[q] = vq.
Therefore, a correct process can decide by applying a deterministic function on
its vector Mp. The EIGByz algorithm ensures the following property:
(∀r, 1 ≤ r ≤ t+1 : Pgood(r)) ⇒ ∀p, q ∈ C : (Mp = M q) ∧ (|Mp| ≥ |C|) (1)
where |Mp| denotes the number of non-⊥ elements in vector Mp, and |C| denotes
number of correct processes. The premise holds if the system is synchronous.
3.2 Extending EIGByz for a Partially Synchronous Model
If Algorithm 1 is executed in a partially synchronous system, it does not ensure
∀p, q ∈ C : (Mp = M q)∧(|Mp| ≥ |C|). Therefore, it cannot ensure the agreement
property of Byzantine consensus. However, following two properties hold for
Algorithm 1 in synchronous as well as in asynchronous periods:
∀p, q ∈ C : Mp[q] ∈ {vq,⊥} (2)
∀q ∈ Π\ C, ∃v s.t. ∀p ∈ C : Mp[q] ∈ {v,⊥} (3)
where vq is the initial value of process q. The proofs are in [14].
To ensure agreement in a partially synchronous system, we need to combine
Algorithm 1 with another algorithm. We show below two such algorithms: (i) a
simple algorithm (Algorithm 2), which requires n > 5t, and (ii) a more complex
algorithmwith optimal resilience n > 3t (Algorithm 3). In both cases, Algorithm 2
and Algorithm 3 ensure agreement, while Algorithm 1 ensures termination.
Consensus Algorithm with n > 5t. We start with a simple parameterized
consensus algorithm (see Algorithm 2). Parametrization allows us to easily adjust
the algorithm to ensure agreement for diﬀerent fault models. The algorithm was
ﬁrst presented in [16] as OneThirdRule algorithm (T = E = 2n/3) to tolerate
t < n/3 benign faults. The parameterized version was given in [17] to tolerate
“corrupted communication”. Here, since we consider “Byzantine process faults”
we need diﬀerent values for the parameters. Note that in the context of Byzantine
faults, Algorithm 2 alone does not ensure termination.
The algorithm consists of a sequence of phases φ, where each phase has two
rounds 2φ−1 and 2φ. Round 2φ is a normal round; to ensure termination, round
2φ − 1 will have to be simulated by Algorithm 1. Each process p has a single
variable xp, and in every round p sends xp to all processes. Parameter T (line 7)
refers to a “threshold” for updating xp, and parameter E (line 13) refers to
“enough” same values to decide.3
With Byzantine faults, Algorithm 2 ensures agreement with E ≥ (n + t)/2
and T ≥ 2n− 2E + 2t. Strong validity requires T ≥ 2t and E ≥ t. Termination,
3 The notation μrp is introduced in Section 2.3.
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Algorithm 2. Byzantine algorithm with n > 5t (code of process p)
1: Initialization:
2: xp := vp ∈ V /* vp is the initial value of p */
3: Round r = 2φ− 1 : /* round simulated by t + 1 micro-rounds of Algorithm 1 */
4: Srp:
5: send 〈xp〉 to all processes
6: T rp :
7: if number of non-⊥ elements in μrp > T then
8: xp := smallest most frequent non-⊥ element in μrp
9: Round r = 2φ :
10: Srp:
11: send 〈xp〉 to all processes
12: T rp :
13: if more than E elements in μrp are equal to v =⊥ then
14: Decide(v)
together with Algorithm 1, requires n − t > T and n − t > E. Putting all
together, for the case E = T , we get T = E = 2(n+ t)/3 and n > 5t. The proofs
of agreement and strong validity are in [14]. We discuss now termination. For
termination, it is suﬃcient for Algorithm 2 to have one round r = 2φ − 1 in
which the following holds (where |μrp| denotes the number of non-⊥ elements in
vector μrp):
∀p, q ∈ C : (μrp = μrq) ∧ (|μrp| > T ) (4)
and one round r + 1 = 2φ in which we have:
∀p ∈ C : |μr+1p | > E. (5)
If (4) holds, all correct processes set xp to the some common value v0 in round r
(line 8), and if (5) holds all correct processes decide v0 in round r + 1 (line 14).
By comparing (1) with (4) and (5), it is easy to see that Algorithm 1 ensures
(4) and (5) if it is executed after GSR, and we have |C| > T and |C| > E
(where |C| = n− t). Therefore, the idea is to replace the send/receive of round
2φ− 1 of Algorithm 2 by the t+1 micro-rounds of Algorithm 1. In other words,
we simulate round r = 2φ − 1 of Algorithm 2 using the t + 1 micro-rounds of
Algorithm 1:
– Each instance of Algorithm 1 is started with Wp = {〈p, xp〉}, where xp is
deﬁned in Algorithm 2;
– At the end of these t + 1 micro-rounds, the vector Mp computed by Al-
gorithm 1 is the vector μp of messages received by p in round r (Mp[q] =
μp[q] = ⊥ means that p did not receive any message from q in round r).
Note that, the OneThirdRule algorithm (Algorithm 2 with T = E = 2n/3)
cannot be used with Byzantine faults because of the agreement problem. Using
EIGByz, a Byzantine process cannot send diﬀerent values to diﬀerent processes
in a single round, however, it can send diﬀerent values to diﬀerent processes in
diﬀerent rounds which violates agreement.
Consensus Algorithm with n > 3t. As Algorithm 2 requires n > 5t, its re-
silience is not optimal. Here we show a new algorithm, which uses mechanisms
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from several consensus algorithms, e.g., Ben-Or [3], and PBFT [7] with strong va-
lidity, and requires only n > 3t (see Algorithm 3). Note that, as for Algorithm 2,
Algorithm 3 ensures strong validity and agreement, but not termination. As for
Algorithm 2, termination is ensured by simulating the ﬁrst round of each phase
φ of Algorithm 3 by t + 1 micro-round of Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 3 consists of a sequence of phases φ, where each phase has three
rounds (3φ−2, 3φ−1, 3φ). Each process p has an estimate xp, a vote value votep
(initially ?), a timestamp tsp attached to votep (initially 0), and a set pre-votep
of valid pairs 〈vote, ts〉 (initially ∅). The structure of the algorithm is as follows:
– If a correct process p receives the same estimate v in round 3φ−2 from n− t
processes, then it accepts v as a valid vote and puts 〈v, φ〉 in pre-votep set.
The pre-vote set is used later to detect an invalid vote.
– If a correct process p receives the same pre-vote 〈v, φ〉 in round 3φ− 1 from
n− t processes, then it votes v (i.e., votep = v) and updates its timestamp
to φ (i.e., tsp = φ).
– If a correct process p receives the same vote v with the same timestamp φ
in round 3φ from 2t + 1 processes, it decides v.
The algorithm guarantees that (i) two correct processes do not vote for diﬀerent
values in the same phase φ; and (ii) once t + 1 correct processes have the same
vote v and the same timestamp φ, no other value can be voted in the following
phases. We discuss now agreement and termination. The full proofs are in [14].
Agreement. A conﬁguration is v-valent if (i) ∃φ such that at least t+1 correct
processes p have (votep, tsp) = (v, ts) with ts ≥ φ, and (ii) the other correct
processes q have (voteq, tsq) = (v′ = v, ts′) with ts′ < φ.
Let φ0 be the smallest round in which some correct process decides v (line 26).
By line 25 at least t+1 correct processes p have votep = v, tsp = φ0, and xp = v
from line 20; the other correct processes q with voteq = v have tsq < φ0 from
line 19. Therefore the v-valent deﬁnition holds. We denote the former set by
Π=φ0 , and the latter by Π<φ0 . Processes in Π=φ0 keep xp = votep = v from
phase φ0 onward, and processes in Π<φ0 can only update votep to ? or v, as we
explain now. This ensures agreement.
First, by lines 10 and 13, it is impossible for a correct process to have two
diﬀerent values with the same timestamp in its pre-vote set. By lines 27-30, in
phase φ0, processes in Π<φ0 can only update votep to ?; processes in Π=φ0 do
not update neither votep, nor xp to some value = v. By lines 10-14, in phase
φ0 +1, correct processes can only update xp to v and can only add (v, φ0 +1) to
pre-votep. Therefore in round 3(φ0 + 1) − 1, correct processes can only update
votep to v, i.e., only v can be decided in phase φ0 + 1. The same reasoning can
be repeated for all phases after phase φ0 + 1.
Termination. We explain intuitively termination by considering the smallest
phase φ such that 3φ− 2 ≥ GSR. We distinguish two cases: (i) at the beginning
of round 3φ − 2, all correct processes have votep =?, and (ii) at the beginning
of round 3φ− 2 at least one correct process has votep =?.
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Algorithm 3. Byzantine algorithm with n > 3t (code of process p)
1: Initialization:
2: xp := vp ∈ V /* vp is the initial value of p */
3: pre-votep := ∅
4: votep ∈ V ∪ {?}, initially ?
5: tsp := 0
6: Round r = 3φ− 2 : /* round simulated by t + 1 micro-rounds of Algorithm 1 */
7: Srp:
8: send 〈xp, votep〉 to all processes
9: T rp :
10: if at least n − t elements in μrp are equal to 〈−, ?〉 then
11: xp := smallest most frequent element 〈x,−〉 in μrp
12: pre-votep := pre-votep ∪ {〈xp, φ〉}
13: if at least n − t elements in μrp are equal to 〈v,−〉 then
14: pre-votep := pre-votep ∪ {〈v, φ〉}
15: Round r = 3φ− 1 :
16: Srp:
17: send 〈v | 〈v, φ〉 ∈ pre-votep〉 to all processes
18: T rp :
19: if at least n − t elements in μrp are equal to 〈v〉 then
20: votep := v; tsp := φ; xp := v
21: Round r = 3φ :
22: Srp:
23: send 〈votep, tsp, pre-votep〉 to all processes
24: T rp :
25: if at least 2t + 1 elements in μrp are equal to 〈v = ?, φ,−〉 then
26: Decide(v)
27: if exists 〈v = ?, ts,−〉 in μrp s.t. votep = v and ts > tsp then
28: if exists t+1 elements 〈−,−, pre-vote〉 in μrp s.t. 〈v, ts′〉 ∈ pre-vote and ts′ ≥ ts then
29: votep := ?; tsp := 0; xp := v
30: if votep = ? then xp := votep
Case (i): Consider round 3φ−2. Since we are after GSR, Algorithm 1 ensures that
all correct processes p receive the same set μ3φ−2p of messages with |μ3φ−2p | ≥ |C|
(see formula (1)), i.e., all correct processes p set xp to the same common value v
(line 11), and add the pair 〈v, φ〉 to pre-votep (line 12). It follows that, in round
3φ− 1, all correct processes p set votep to v (line 20), and all correct processes
decide v in round 3φ (line 26).
Case (ii): This case is more complex to expose. Consider round 3φ, and let q
be a correct process with the highest timestamp tsq and voteq = v =? at the
beginning of round 3φ. Line 19 ensures that for any other correct process q′ with
tsq′ = tsq, we have voteq = voteq′ . Since 3φ > GSR, all correct processes p
with votep = v execute lines 27-29. Therefore, at the end of round 3φ all correct
processes p have xp = v and votep ∈ {v, ?}, i.e., all correct processes p start
round 3φ + 1 = 3(φ + 1)− 2 with xp = v. If the condition of line 10 holds, then
the most frequent pair received is 〈v,−〉, i.e., 〈v, φ + 1〉 is added to pre-votep
(line 12). The condition of line 13 necessary holds at each correct process, i.e.,
〈v, φ+1〉 is added to pre-votep (line 14). Therefore, at the end of round 3φ+1,
all correct processes p only have 〈y, φ + 1〉 with y = v in pre-votep. It follows
that, in round 3φ + 2, all correct processes p set votep to v (line 20), and all
correct processes decide v in round 3φ + 3 (line 26).
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Note that in Algorithm 3, the set pre-votep can be bounded, based on the
following observation. For instance, if 〈v, φ〉 ∈ pre-votep and p wants to add
〈v, φ′〉 into its pre-vote with φ′ > φ, then 〈v, φ〉 becomes obsolete.
3.3 Summary
The following table summarizes our results. The second column shows the small-
est number of processes needed for each algorithm. The third and forth columns
give an upper bound on number of rounds needed for a single consensus in both
best and worst cases. The best case is when the system is synchronous form the
beginning, i.e., GSR = 0. Both algorithms require n2 messages per round.
#processes # rounds (best case) # rounds (worst case)
Algorithm 2 5t + 1 t + 2 GSR + 2(t + 2)− 1
Algorithm 3 3t + 1 t + 3 GSR + 2(t + 3)− 1
3.4 Optimizations
We describe two possible optimizations that can be applied to our leader-free
Byzantine consensus algorithm.
Early termination. The “early termination” optimization can be applied to
Algorithm 1 (EIGByz ). Algorithm 1 always requires t + 1 rounds, even in ex-
ecutions in which no process is faulty. With early termination, the number of
rounds can be reduced in such cases.
Let f denote the actual number of faulty processes in a given execution.
Moses and Waarts in [18] present an early termination version of the exponential
information gathering protocol for Byzantine consensus that requires n > 4t and
terminates in min{t+1, f +2} rounds. The idea is the following. Consider some
node α in p’s tree. Process p may know that a quorum (i.e., n − |α| − t) of
correct children of node α store the same value. When this happens, process
p can already determine the value of newvalp(α), and can stop at the end of
the next round. The paper presents another early termination protocol with
optimal resiliency (n > 3t) that terminates in min{t + 1, f + 3} rounds. These
two optimizations can be applied to Algorithm 1.
One round decision. The “one round decision” optimization is relevant to
Algorithm 2. One round decision means that if all correct processes start with
the same initial value, and the system is synchronous from the beginning, then
correct processes decide in one single round. Algorithm 2 does not achieve one
round decision, because the simulation of Algorithm 1 (EIGByz ) appears in each
phase, including phase 1. To achieve one round decision, we simply skip round 1,
and start Algorithm 2 with round 2. If all correct processes start with the same
initial value, and GSR = 0, then correct processes decide in one round.
The fact that our one round decision algorithm requires “only” n > 5t is not in
contradiction with the result in [19], which establishes the lower bound n = 7t+1
for one-step decision. The reason is that we assume for fast decision a partially
synchronous system with GSR = 0, i.e., the system is initially synchronous,
while [19] considers a system that is initially asynchronous.
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4 Discussion and Future Work
In a partially synchronous system the predicate Pgood(r) can be ensured using
the implementations given in [6]. Actually, [6] distinguishes two variant of partial
synchrony: (a) one in which the communication bound Δ and the process bound
Φ are unknown, and (b) one in which these bounds are known but hold only
eventually.The implementation of the round model slightly diﬀers depending on
the partial synchrony variant that is considered. We consider here model (a),
which is also the model considered in the leader-based Castro-Liskov PBFT
protocol [7]. In this model a standard technique, used for example in PBFT, is
to have exponentially growing timeouts. For example, in PBFT whenever the
leader changes (i.e., the recovery protocol has to be executed), the timeout for
the next leader is doubled. Taking this leader-based protocol as a case study,
Amir et al. [10] pointed its vulnerability to performance degradation under an
attack. Indeed in PBFT, f consecutive Byzantine leaders, say l1, l2, ..., lf could
do construct the following attack. The ﬁrst leader l1 is mute, the timeout expires,
the recovery protocol is activated, and the algorithm switches to the next leader
(rotating coordinator) while doubling the timeout. The same happens for leaders
l2 to lf−1 until lf becomes leader. The last leader lf sends its message as late
as possible, but not too late to remain leader. If lf remains leader forever, then
the time required for any request (instance of consensus) is high.
Although PBFT does not assume a round-based model as we do in this paper,
the performance failure attack is possible in the case of a leader-based protocol
implemented in the round-based model, in the case the round-based model is
constructed on top of a partially synchronous model of type (a). However, we
believe that this is not the case for leader-free algorithms, i.e., performance
failure attacks are not eﬀective in this case. The intuition is that, once the
timeout of a correct process becomes large enough to receive all messages from
correct processes, Byzantine processes cannot introduce an attack that forces the
correct process to double its timeout. Our future work is to validate this intuition
analytically and/or experimentally, and to understand under which conditions
leader-free algorithms outperform leader-based algorithms.
5 Conclusion
All previously knowndeterministic consensus algorithms for partially synchronous
systems and Byzantine faults are leader-based. However, leader-based algorithms
are vulnerable to performance degradation, which occurs when the Byzantine
leader sends messages slowly, but without triggering timeouts. In the paper we
have proposed a deterministic (no randomization), leader-free Byzantine con-
sensus algorithm in a partially synchronous system. Our algorithm is resilient-
optimal (it requires 3t+1 processes) and signature-free (it doesn’t rely on digital
signatures). To the best of our knowledge this is the ﬁrst Byzantine algorithm
that satisﬁes all these characteristics. We have also presented optimizations for
the Byzantine consensus algorithm, including one-round decision. Finally, a sim-
pler leader-free consensus algorithm that uses digital signatures is proposed.
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We have designed our algorithms using a new methodology. It consists of ex-
tending a synchronous consensus algorithm to a partially synchronous consensus
algorithm using an asynchronous algorithm.The asynchronous protocol ensures
safety (i.e., agreement and strong validity), while the synchronous algorithm
provides liveness (i.e., termination) during periods of synchrony.
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